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Introduction 
The Commission on Scottish Devolution chaired by Sir 
Kenneth Calman delivered its report in June 2009. Among 
its recommendations on transfers of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament were a set of income tax proposals. 
 
Following the publication of the Calman report (2009), we 
identified certain technical problems relating to these tax 
proposals. These were the subject of an open letter we sent 
to the Calman Commission in July 2009. This note begins 
with a review of the position on these technical problems, in 
the light of the publication of the Westminster Government’s 
White Paper on Calman in November, (Cm 7738). Our 
conclusion is that, far from addressing the technical 
problems we had identified, the proposals in the White 
Paper in fact make one of these problems significantly 
worse. We also consider other significant issues relating to 
the potential effect of the proposed tax-sharing 
arrangements on the relations between the Scottish and 
Westminster governments, and to the potential utility of the 
new tax raising powers of the Scottish government as an 
instrument of fiscal policy. We conclude that both the 
original Calman report, and the White Paper, have failed to 
address these issues adequately.  
 
Problems identified in original Calman 
proposals 
The basic proposal on income tax in the Calman report can 
be summarised as follows. All income tax rates in Scotland 
would be reduced by 10p. At the same time, the Block Grant 
coming to the Scottish government would suffer a once and 
for all reduction equal to the amount which the 10p tax cut 
had cost the Whitehall Exchequer. The Scottish government 
would then be able to set its own rate of income tax, which 
would be levied as an addition to the reduced UK rate in 
Scotland. Hence, if the Scottish government set its rate at 
10p, it would, at least initially, return its revenues to their 
original value. Note that the determination of the income tax 
bands themselves would remain under the control of 
Westminster. 
 
What was the expected result of this change? In essence, 
the Commission was seeking to achieve greater financial 
accountability for the Scottish Parliament, while at the same 
time trying to strengthen the UK union. Under its proposal, 
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the Scottish government would have to make a definite 
decision about what rate of income tax it would set. For the 
first time, the Scottish parliament would be accountable not 
only for how it spent its money but also for how it raised a 
major part of the money it wanted to spend. In criticising the 
existing Block Grant method of funding the Scottish 
Parliament, the Commission noted that the Parliament “has 
no fiscal powers that can be used as policy instruments and 
it does not have a direct financial stake in the performance 
of the Scottish economy”: (Calman report, para. 3.87). We 
can reasonably assume that the Commission intended its 
proposal to remedy these defects. 
 
In the open letter which we sent to the Calman commission 
in July 2009, we identified two technical problems with these 
proposals.
1  
 The first of these related to the possibility that 
there could be an undesirable outcome from the proposed 
new tax system in that, under certain circumstances, the 
income tax revenues coming to the Scottish government 
might move in a different direction to overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland. (As shorthand, we describe 
this situation as the possibility of an anomalous movement 
in tax revenues). The second technical problem related to 
the adverse effects which fiscal drag was likely to have, if 
the Calman proposals were implemented. We now consider 
these two problems in more detail. 
 
Possible anomalous movements in tax revenues 
Let us assume a Scottish government is operating under the 
income tax system as originally proposed by Calman. If the 
Scottish government sets the Scottish rate of income tax as 
x pence in the £, then it will receive a proportion 
10)(x
x

 of 
the basic rate income tax revenues collected in Scotland, 
(with corresponding proportions 
30)(x
x

 and 
0)4(x
x

 for the 
intermediate and highest tax bands respectively). Since  
10)(x
x

 is an increasing function of x, the Scottish 
government will receive an increasing proportion of the 
overall basic rate revenues raised in Scotland, as it 
increases its tax rate x, ( and similarly for the other tax 
bands). It will receive a decreasing proportion as it reduces 
x.  
 
A number of different outcomes are possible. Suppose that 
the Scottish government reduces the Scottish rate of tax, 
and at the same time, overall income tax revenues in 
Scotland decrease. Then the Scottish government will be 
receiving a decreasing proportion of a decreasing total – so 
that the revenues coming to the Scottish government will 
clearly be reducing. In this case, the overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland, and those coming to the 
Scottish government, are moving in the same direction.  
 
Suppose, however, that when the Scottish government 
decreases the Scottish rate of tax, overall income tax 
revenues collected in Scotland increase. Then the Scottish 
government will be getting a decreasing fraction of an 
increasing total. In these circumstances, it is not possible to 
say without further information whether the tax revenues 
coming to the Scottish government will be increasing or 
decreasing. But in principle, it is clear that, if the increase in 
overall tax revenues is not particularly large, then the 
amount of revenue coming to the Scottish government might 
decrease. That is, total income tax revenues, and the 
income tax revenues coming to the Scottish government, 
could move in different directions.  
 
Annex 1 examines the algebra surrounding this situation in 
more detail. It identifies precisely when the anomalous effect 
of the Scottish government’s income tax revenues moving in 
a different direction to overall income tax revenues collected 
in Scotland will occur. The relevant conditions derived in 
Annex 1 are summarised here:  
 
Within the basic rate band of income tax: if the effect of a 
unit decrease in the income tax rate in Scotland is to 
increase the overall income tax revenues from the basic 
rate, but by less than 5%, then the revenue coming to the 
Scottish government from the basic rate band will decrease. 
 
Within the higher rate bands: if the effect of a unit 
decrease in the income tax rate in Scotland is to increase 
total revenues, but by less than 7.5% for the 40% band, or 
8% for the 50% band, then the revenue coming to the 
Scottish government from the relevant band will decrease. 
 
Two questions therefore become very relevant: 
 
a) Would it matter if a Scottish government found 
itself operating in a position where this anomaly 
held? 
 
b) How likely is it that the conditions for this anomaly 
to hold will actually be met? 
 
As regards the first question, we argue that it would matter a 
great deal if a Scottish government found itself in this 
position. Suppose that total income tax revenues could be 
increased by a reduction in the Scottish rate of tax, probably 
supported by other stimulatory measures. If, however, the 
tax elasticities were such that the anomaly held, then the 
Scottish government would have to reconcile itself to 
suffering a permanent reduction in its own revenues if it 
wanted to stimulate the Scottish economy by lowering taxes 
– even though the Whitehall exchequer would benefit from 
increased revenues. More realistically, at a time of stringent 
pressure on its finances, a Scottish government operating 
under these conditions could well find itself forced to raise 
its tax rates to boost its own revenues – at the expense of 
deflating the Scottish economy, and also at the expense of 
the Whitehall exchequer. So if the anomalous conditions 
actually held, the Scottish government could be forced into 
actions which were perverse – both from the point of view of 
the Scottish economy, and of the Whitehall exchequer. By 
contrast, if the tax elasticities were exactly the same, but the 
Scottish government’s income tax revenues always moved 
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in the same direction as total income tax revenues raised in 
Scotland, then a Scottish government could lower its tax 
rate - to the benefit of the Scottish economy, its own 
revenues, and the UK exchequer. 
 
This then makes the second question very important. Are 
the conditions of the Calman anomaly so unlikely that the 
possibility of their occurring can be discounted: or is there a 
significant chance that these conditions could actually hold? 
We do not have a definitive answer to this question, but the 
following points are relevant.  
 
a) There is little or no experience of this particular situation. 
What is relevant is what happens to tax revenues in 
Scotland, when the income tax rate in Scotland is varied, 
with the tax rate in the rest of the UK remaining fixed. 
This is a situation which has never been met with before 
in the UK. 
 
b) In practice, a Scottish government would probably 
deploy a package of measures, as well as a cut in the 
Scottish rate of income tax, if it were trying to stimulate 
the economy. Such measures might include, for 
example, cuts in non-domestic rates, or in water prices. 
So the relevant question is not what happens to total 
income tax revenues in Scotland when tax rates are 
varied while everything else is held constant, (which is 
the conventional Laffer curve), but what the response 
would be to an overall stimulus package.  
 
c)   Without attempting an overall literature review, it is 
relevant to note one piece of evidence. This is the paper 
by Gagné, Nadeau, and Vaillancourt, (2000), which 
suggests that in Canada the response to income tax rate 
changes at the provincial level could well have a 
negative elasticity in the higher rate tax bands.  
 
Overall, the view we take is that a stimulus package for the 
Scottish economy, including a reduction in income tax rates 
in Scotland relative to England, might boost the Scottish 
economy sufficiently to produce a modest increase in total 
income tax revenues in Scotland. Given this, we argue that 
a precautionary principle should be adopted in designing 
any new taxation system: so that whatever income tax 
arrangements are eventually implemented for the devolved 
Scottish government, there should be no possibility of total 
income tax revenues, and the income tax revenues coming 
to the Scottish government, moving in opposite directions. 
The original Calman proposals fail this test. We set out later, 
for interest, a modification of the Calman proposals which 
would avoid the problem. 
 
Effects of fiscal drag 
If the Scottish government sets a tax rate of around 10p, 
then it will receive approximately 50%, 25%, and 20%, 
respectively of the total tax revenues raised in Scotland from 
the basic rate, intermediate, and highest rate bands. These 
widely differing proportions would, in practice, give rise to 
the following two problems:  
a)  Because of the effects of fiscal drag, there is likely to be 
a consistent shift through time in the proportion of overall 
tax revenues raised from the different bands. Combined 
with the differing proportions of revenues coming to the 
Scottish government within each band, this will then lead 
to a consistent trend in the tax revenues going to the 
Scottish government, over and above any trend in 
overall tax revenues. Since the effect of fiscal drag is 
usually to increase the proportion of tax raised at the 
higher bands, (from which the Scottish government 
receives a smaller proportion of the revenues), the 
expected outcome is that there would be a declining 
trend in the overall proportion of tax revenues in 
Scotland actually coming to the Scottish government.  
 
b)   Secondly, whenever the UK government, which is in 
charge of the UK income tax system, changed the tax 
thresholds or the structure of the system, there would be 
a shift in the relative amounts of tax collected in the 
different bands – and hence, a change in the amount of 
tax allocated to the Scottish government. At the very 
least, this would open the Scottish government to the 
danger of unpredictable and unplanned changes in its 
tax revenues. At its worst, this situation could be 
manipulated deliberately by a UK government, if it 
wished to trim the resources going to the Scottish 
government. Either way, the Scottish government would 
be placed in an insupportable position.  
 
 
A modification to the Calman proposals 
which would avoid the above problems 
In our open letter, we derived conditions which a tax sharing 
system of the Calman type would have to satisfy, in order to 
ensure that both of the difficulties identified in the preceding 
section were avoided. The argument is as follows. 
 
Annex 2 derives the conditions under which, for a general 
class of tax sharing systems, total tax revenues, and the 
revenue going to the Scottish government, will always move 
in the same direction. In words, the key requirement is that, 
in any tax band, if overall tax revenues drop as the Scottish 
tax rate increases, then the percentage increase in the 
share of tax revenues going to the Scottish government 
should be smaller than the percentage decrease in overall 
tax revenues. But since the potential decrease in tax 
revenues (if any) resulting from an increase in the Scottish 
tax rate is unknown, the only way that it can be guaranteed 
that the condition will always be met is if the percentage 
increase in the share of tax revenues going to the Scottish 
government is zero: that is, within each tax band, if the tax 
sharing system gives the Scottish government a fixed share 
of the tax revenues raised in Scotland in that band.  
 
The circumstances under which the fiscal drag problem will 
be avoided are that the percentage share of the tax 
revenues from each tax band going to the Scottish 
government must be the same.  
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The implication is that, if both the problem of anomalous 
revenue movements, and the problems associated with 
fiscal drag, are to be avoided, then the Scottish government 
should receive a fixed percentage share of the overall 
income tax revenues raised in Scotland. 
 
Hence a tax sharing system which would always avoid both 
problems would involve the Scottish government setting its 
own rate of tax, (as proposed by Calman), but the Scottish 
government then receiving the same, fixed, percentage 
share of overall income tax revenues collected in Scotland. 
 
Note that, while this modification of the Calman proposals 
would solve the identified technical problems, we are not 
ourselves advocating that this modification should be 
implemented, for the following reason. Under the modified 
Calman system, a decision by the Scottish government to 
change the Scottish rate of income tax would clearly have a 
direct impact on the revenues received by the UK 
government: and conversely, any change in tax rate by the 
UK government would have a direct impact on the revenues 
of the Scottish government. Successful operation of this 
system would thus require that the UK and devolved 
governments were willing to operate in a collegiate manner 
– being appreciative of, and respecting, the impact that their 
own actions will have on the revenues of the other parties. 
The implication is that a successful tax sharing system 
would have to involve a more federal way of working than is 
the current practice in the UK. It would be a mistake to 
introduce such a system unless all the potential 
ramifications of this had been clearly thought through in 
advance. (Note that the Calman proposals themselves 
would have an effect on UK tax revenue, but this would be a 
second order, rather than a first order effect.) 
 
The White Paper on Calman of 25th 
November 
On 25th November 2009, the UK government published its 
White Paper with its proposals for taking forward the 
Calman recommendations. As regards income tax, the 
White Paper proposed that the Calman recommendations 
should be implemented virtually in their original form. There 
is, however, one important exception, which we discuss in 
this section. This relates to the transitional arrangements 
proposed in the White Paper. These would in fact have a 
very significant effect on the operation of the tax sharing 
system – and in a way which makes the potential for 
anomalous revenue movement much worse. It is fair to say 
that the implications of the White Paper’s transitional 
arrangements seem to have escaped general comment. 
 
The transitional arrangements are described in paragraphs 
4.18 and 4.19 of the White Paper. It is stated there that the 
Calman proposals on income tax will need to be phased in 
carefully “at a time of major fiscal adjustment and economic 
uncertainty”. During the phasing in period, the adjustment to 
the Block Grant will not be done on a one off basis, but will 
be calculated afresh for each new Public Expenditure 
spending review – that is, every three years. The UK 
government would forecast tax receipts from Scottish  
taxpayers for the three years of each spending review, and 
a sum equivalent to a 10p reduction in the rate of income 
tax would then be subtracted from the Scottish Block Grant 
for each of these years.  
 
The White Paper puts no specific time limit on the operation 
of these transitional arrangements, but says that there 
would be a move towards the full model proposed by 
Calman as soon as economic and fiscal circumstances 
permitted. 
 
Given that current economic uncertainties look set to persist 
for the foreseeable future, it seems likely that the transitional 
arrangements would operate for a significant length of time.  
 
Suppose that the transitional arrangements are in operation, 
and that a Scottish government reduces the Scottish rate of 
income tax below 10p to, say, 8p. When the Westminster 
government next comes to adjust the Scottish Block grant, it 
will subtract from the original Scottish Block grant an 
amount equal to the estimated yield of a 10p income tax 
rate in Scotland. Assuming the Westminster government is 
accurate in its estimate, this will be a larger amount than 
what the Scottish government gets back from the lower 
Scottish tax rate it has set. In other words, under the 
arrangements set out in the White Paper, if the Scottish 
government reduces its tax rate below 10p, it will always 
suffer financially. This would happen even if the reduction in 
the Scottish tax rate was part of a successful package to 
stimulate the Scottish economy, as a result of which overall 
income tax revenues in Scotland actually went up. 
 
Conversely, if the Scottish government raises the Scottish 
income tax rate above 10p, then the Scottish government 
will always benefit financially – even if the effect of the tax 
rise had been to damage the economy, leading to a 
reduction in overall income tax revenues collected in 
Scotland.  
 
In fact, a stronger result can be proved about the effect of 
the transitional arrangements. It is not just the case that a 
Scottish government is worse off by cutting its tax rate 
below 10p relative to what it would receive if it set a 10p 
rate: and vice versa if it set a rate above 10p. The stronger 
result also holds that, for all tax rates which are likely to be 
feasible in practice, the slope of the curve relating the 
Scottish government’s revenues to the Scottish rate of 
income tax is positive. This result is proved in Annex 3. It 
can be seen from the Annex that the conditions under which 
this result holds are so general as to justify our assertion 
that the result holds for all feasible tax rates. 
 
What this result means is that, under the transitional 
arrangements, the Scottish government will always face 
what is in effect an upward sloping Laffer curve, for any 
feasible tax rate it might consider setting. The first technical 
problem we identified with the original Calman proposals 
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has now actually become much worse. Previously, if the 
elasticity of overall income tax revenues was sufficiently 
negative there was still a chance that the elasticity of 
Scottish government revenues might be negative too. Under 
the Calman transitional arrangements, there is no such 
chance.  
 
It is unclear what effect the transitional arrangements have 
on the second technical problem we identified, relating to 
fiscal drag. Under one scenario, however, the effect can be 
predicted. Suppose that both the unadjusted Block Grant, 
and total income tax revenues collected in Scotland, were 
rising in line with inflation. Suppose also that the yield of a 
10p tax rate in Scotland represents a decreasing proportion 
of total tax revenues, because of fiscal drag. Then a 
Scottish government which set a 10p tax rate in the absence 
of the transitional arrangements would see its revenues 
rising more slowly than inflation: whereas with the 
transitional arrangements in place, its revenues would rise 
in line with inflation. Under this scenario, therefore, the 
transitional arrangements do indeed overcome one of the 
major problems associated with fiscal drag. However, this 
particular scenario is relatively unlikely. Under other, more 
complicated scenarios, it is not clear what the effect of the 
interaction of fiscal drag and the transitional arrangements 
would be. 
 
Important issues not addressed in either the 
Calman Report or the White Paper 
In the section above where we derived a modification to the 
Calman proposals which would avoid the identified technical 
problems, we expressed caution about implementing this 
change, because of the implications it would have for the 
relations between the Scottish and Westminster 
governments. This issue, however, is not just confined to 
this particular modification of Calman. Any system of tax 
sharing, including the original Calman proposals 
themselves, is going to have an effect on the relationship, 
and mode of working, between the different layers of 
government involved. The Calman report did indeed 
recommend that the liaison arrangements between the 
Westminster and Scottish governments would have to be 
strengthened, in the light of their proposals on tax sharing. 
But they did not analyse in detail the specific tensions and 
pressures which the new system would be subject to: hence 
it is not clear whether Calman’s specific proposals on 
improving liaison would be able to cope.  
 
Among important questions which need to be addressed are 
the following. Would implementation of the original Calman 
proposals, (leaving aside their technical flaws), result in 
fundamental shifts in the relations between the different 
parties which would institute a dynamic for further change? 
Is it possible to implement a tax sharing system which is 
technically acceptable, without moving to something akin to 
a federal system? These are fundamental questions, which 
the Calman report, and the White Paper, signally failed to 
address.  
 
Another important set of questions which were similarly 
neglected in both the Report and the White Paper relates to 
how effective the proposed tax varying powers would be as 
a tool which the Scottish government could use in economic 
management, and fiscal policy. As we have already noted, 
the lack of such tools was one of Calman’s criticisms of the 
existing block grant arrangements: and it is reasonable to 
assume that the Calman Commission hoped that their 
proposals would remedy this lack. Despite this, neither the 
report nor the White Paper pay any attention to examining 
the question of whether their proposed tax varying powers 
would constitute an effective economic management tool for 
the Scottish government. In fact, our analysis above 
suggests that there is a grave risk that the proposed powers 
would have perverse effects which could gravely damage 
the Scottish economy – this being particularly the case for 
the White Paper transitional arrangements. The implication 
is that the proposed powers would be worse than useless as 
tools of economic management. We find it very surprising 
that Calman, having identified the need for fiscal powers 
that could be used as policy instruments, and for the 
Scottish government to have a direct financial stake in the 
performance of the Scottish economy, paid no attention to 
the question of whether the proposed changes actually 
fulfilled these requirements. If the Calman Commission had 
considered this topic, it seems likely that they would have 
discovered for themselves the anomalous effects, and likely 
adverse implications for the Scottish economy, which are 
implicit in their proposals. 
 
If the questions identified in this section are not addressed, 
and likewise, if the identified technical problems are not 
rectified, then implementation of the Calman tax proposals 
could rapidly prove very unsatisfactory for all the parties 
concerned. This could, paradoxically, weaken the existing 
union – quite counter to Calman’s stated aim of introducing 
change which would actually strengthen the union. 
 
 
Conclusions 
We draw three main conclusions from the above.  
 
1. The transitional arrangements introduced in the White 
Paper make the first of the technical problems identified 
in our open letter significantly worse. The effect is that, 
with the transitional arrangements in operation, the curve 
relating the revenues a Scottish government will receive 
to the Scottish rate of income tax will always be upward 
sloping. Even if a Scottish government were able to 
stimulate the Scottish economy by a combined stimulus 
package involving income tax cuts, and even if this had 
the effect of increasing overall income tax revenues in 
Scotland, its own revenues would reduce. Conversely, 
under the transitional arrangements, a Scottish 
government could always increase its revenues by 
raising the Scottish rate of tax, even if this meant severe 
deflation of the Scottish economy, and a reduction in 
overall income tax revenues in Scotland. These effects 
are so perverse, that we argue it would be disastrous if 
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the White Paper on the Calman proposals on income tax 
were implemented as they stand. 
 
2. The complete absence from the White Paper of any 
discussion of technical issues relating to tax, and the 
introduction in the White Paper of transitional 
arrangements, without any apparent appreciation of the 
significant effects these would have, both indicate an 
altogether inadequate level of technical treatment in the 
drafting of the White Paper. We conclude that any 
serious attempt to reform the taxation arrangements for 
the Scottish government should proceed on the basis of 
a much more informed level of technical discussion. A 
cynic might say that the absence of consideration of 
technical issues in the White Paper suggests that the 
White Paper is more of a political document, rather than 
a serious attempt to reform the taxation arrangements 
for devolution.   
 
3. The Calman report, and the subsequent White Paper, 
are alike deficient in the limited attention they pay to 
analysing the effect which the introduction of their 
proposals on taxation would have on the way in which 
the different levels of government interact. There are 
fundamental questions here which need to be addressed 
in much more detail. In particular, it is not clear whether 
it would be feasible to devise a workable system of tax 
sharing without moving towards a more federal system 
of government. Similarly, both documents neglect the 
important question of how effective the proposed tax 
varying powers would be as a tool which the Scottish 
government could use in economic management, and 
fiscal policy. We conclude that any attempt to reform the 
tax arrangements for devolution should involve a much 
more detailed assessment of such issues. 
 
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1
(The text of our open letter, together with subsequent 
correspondence with the Scotland Office, can be found at 
www.cuthbert1.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk ). 
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Annex 1: The conditions under which anomalous movements in tax revenues occur 
 
Suppose that the original Calman proposals on income tax are in operation.  
 
The basic rate is considered first. 
Let T(y) = total basic rate tax revenues in Scotland, when tax levied at rate y: 
let f(x) = basic rate revenue going to the Scottish government, when it sets its tax rate at x. 
Now when the Scottish government sets its tax rate at x, it will, to a good approximation, receive a proportion 
 x) (10
x

 of the basic rate revenues raised in Scotland when the aggregate rate is (10+x). So the fundamental 
relationship between f and T is that  
  
x)T(10
 x) (10
x
   f(x) 


 . 
The anomalous condition that we are interested in occurs, by definition, when the slopes, (that is, the first 
derivatives), of  f(x) and x)T(10 have opposite signs. 
Differentiating with respect to x, we can see that 
  
x)T(10 
 x) (10
10
  x)(10' T
 x) (10
x
   (x)' f
2





 
   = ) x)T(10 
 x) (10
10
  x)(10'  xT( 
 x) (10
1
  



                    (1) 
It follows from expression (1) that 0   (x)' f   whenever 0   x)(10' T   : so the anomaly can never occur when 
0   x)(10' T 
. 
It also follows from (1) that  
                 0   (x)' f  if and only if  0   ) x)T(10 
 x) (10
10
  x)(10'  xT(   

 , 
 that is, 
 if and only if     x)T(10 
 x) x(10
10-
     x)(10' T    

     . 
This implies that the anomaly will occur if, and only if, 
 
      x)T(10 
 x) x(10
10-
     x)(10' T    0    

  
 
Looking at the key “starting position” of x=10 in more detail, it is possible to identify more precisely the conditions 
under which the anomaly will occur: namely, 
if and only if      )01T(10 
10)  10(10
10-
     )01(10' T    0    

  
  that is if and only if  5-   
20
100-
    
T(20)
(20).100' T
    0   . 
 
The term in the middle of this last expression is approximately the percentage change in overall basic rate tax 
revenues in Scotland, resulting from a 1p increase in the tax rate: (this can be seen on taking the first two terms in a 
Taylor expansion). So the anomaly will occur if a 1p increase in the tax rate in Scotland leads to a reduction in total 
basic rate revenues collected, but a reduction which is less than 5%. An alternative way of expressing the same 
condition is that a 1p reduction in the tax rate leads to an increase in revenues collected at the basic rate, but an 
increase which is less than 5%. This is the form of the condition quoted in the text of the paper. 
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The algebra for revenues coming from the higher rate tax bands is similar, but the numbers are different.  Let H(y) 
represent total tax revenues in Scotland from the middle tax band, (currently the 40% tax band), when tax is levied at 
rate y: then what the Scottish government gets from this tax band, when it sets its tax rate at x, is 
x)H(30
 x) (30
x
  

. A similar argument to the above shows that the critical threshold in this case is 7.5%, (as 
compared to 5% for the basic rate tax band). Similarly, for the highest rate tax band, (currently 50%), the critical 
threshold is 8%.  
  
Annex 2: The conditions under which a general tax sharing system will avoid the 
anomaly 
 
Consider the basic rate.  
 
As in Annex 1, let T(y) = total basic rate tax revenues in Scotland, when tax levied at rate y: 
let f(x) = basic rate revenue going to the Scottish government, when it sets its tax rate at x. 
Consider a general tax sharing system, defined by the relationship 
 
  f(x) = a(x) T(10+x) + c,  
 
where a(x) is the proportion of overall basic rate tax revenues going to the Scottish government when it sets its tax 
rate at x, and c is a constant, (which could be zero). 
 
It is reasonable to assume 0  (x)a'  . 
Again, we are interested in the slope or first derivative of f(x). Now, 
 
x)T(10 (x)a'  x)(10T' a(x)  (x)' f  
, 
 
Since  x)T(10 (x)a'  x)(10T' a(x)  (x)' f   , 
it follows that (x)' f and x)(10T'   will have the same signs if either  
(i) 0 x)(10T'  , or  
(ii) 0    x)(10T'   , and 0    x)T(10 (x)a'  x)(10T' a(x)   , 
 that is, if 0    x)(10T'   , and 
 x)T(10
x)(10T'-
  
a(x)
(x)a'


  . 
 
In words, these conditions mean that the anomaly will not occur if the effect of an increase in the rate of tax is to 
increase total revenues collected in Scotland: or if the effect of an increase in the rate of tax is to reduce revenues 
collected, while at the same time the percentage increase in the proportion of income tax revenues coming to the 
Scottish government is smaller than the percentage decrease in overall revenues. 
 
Annex 3: Under the White Paper transitional arrangements, the slope of the curve relating 
the Scottish Government’s revenues to the Scottish rate of income tax is positive, for all 
feasible tax rates. 
 
For simplicity, we ignore for the present the higher rates of tax. As in the previous annexes, let T(y) = total basic rate 
tax revenues in Scotland, when tax is levied at rate y. 
Let B = block grant which would have come to Scottish government, if the tax sharing arrangement in Calman had 
not been implemented. (Both B and T will also be functions of time: but for the purposes of the present argument, we 
lose nothing by omitting the time variable.) 
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Let f(x) now represent the total revenues coming to the Scottish government, from both the block grant, and via its 
share of income tax, assuming the White Paper transitional arrangements are operational, when the Scottish rate of 
tax is x. Then, if the Westminster government is accurate in its estimate of how much 10p accounts for out of the total 
tax take in Scotland, what the Scottish government will receive will be B, reduced by the transitional adjustment of 
10/(x+10) of T(10+x), plus the amount raised by the Scottish rate of tax, which is x/(x+10) of T(10+x). Thus, 
 
  x)T(10
10)(x
10)-(x
  B  f(x) 

                                                     (2) 
Hence  x)01T(
10)(x
10))-(x - 10)((x
  x)(10T'
10)(x
10)-(x
  (x)' f 
2





  
   
  x)]01T(
10)(x
20
  x)(1010)T'-[(x
10)(x
1
 



  . 
 
Looking at the expression within the square brackets, there are then four different cases to consider, as follows:- 
(a) If 0  x)(10T'  , and if x > 10: in this case, 0  (x)' f   always. 
(b) If 0  x)(10T'  , and if 10 x  : in this case, 0  (x)' f   
if and only if  0  x)]01T(
10)(x
20
  x)(1010)T'-[(x 

  , 
if and only if  
)x-(100
20
  
10)10)(x-(x
20-
  
x)T(10
x)(10T'
2





                               (3) 
 
But the function on the right hand side of this expression is an increasing function of x on the range (0, 10). So 
condition (3) will always be satisfied if  
x)T(10
x)(10T'


is less than the value of the expression on the right evaluated at 
x=0. But the value of the expression at x=0 is 0.2 .  So if the percentage increase in total basic rate tax revenues 
raised in Scotland stemming from a unit increase in the tax rate is less than 20%, (which under any feasible scenario 
will always be the case), then the implication is that  (x)' f will indeed be positive in case (b). 
(c) If 0  x)(10T'  , and if x < 10: in this case, 0  (x)' f   always. 
(d) If 0  x)(10T'  , and if 10 x  : in this case,  0  (x)' f   
if and only if  0  x)]01T(
10)(x
20
  x)(1010)T'-[(x 

  , 
if and only if   
10)10)(x-(x
20-
  
x)T(10
x)(10T'




    , 
if and only if   
100)-(x
20
 
x)T(10
x)(10T'-
2



               (4)                       
 
But the function on the right hand side of this expression is a decreasing function of x for x>10. So condition (4) will 
always be satisfied for x in the range 10 < x < 15, say, if  
x)T(10
x)(10T'-


is less than the value of the expression on 
the right evaluated at x=15. But the value of the expression at x=15 is 0.16 .  So if the percentage decrease in basic 
rate tax revenues stemming from a unit increase in the tax rate is less than 16%, (which under any feasible scenario 
is always likely to be the case), then the implication is that  (x)' f will indeed be positive in case (d), at least for all x 
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in the range 0 < x < 15. It would appear very unlikely that a Scottish government would ever set a Scottish rate of tax 
which is more than 5p higher than the rate in the rest of the UK. 
In each of the four possible cases, therefore, 0  (x)' f   either without any further conditions, or under conditions 
which are always likely to be met in practice. This justifies our assertion that 0  (x)' f   for all feasible tax rates. 
 
The above proof has been given for the basic rate case. Essentially the same argument goes through, and the same 
conclusions apply, for the intermediate and higher bands, with the following changes:- 
The relevant terms in formula (2) become x)H(30
30)(x
10)-(x


 and x)G(40
40)(x
10)-(x


 for the intermediate and 
highest rate bands respectively, where the functions H and G represent total revenues at these bands. 
In case (b), the figure of 20% for the basic rate becomes 13.3% for the intermediate rate, and 12.5% for the highest 
rate. 
In case (d), the figure of 16% for the basic rate becomes 17.7% for the intermediate rate, and 18.2% for the highest 
rate. 
